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Zeta Aspect
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Joined: 08 Nov 2005
Location: Vancouver, Washington |
40.  Posted: Mon Mar 06, 2006 1:43 am Post subject: |
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| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | ZetaAspect wrote: | | Doesn't the Pyrrhonian, in a way, assent to what appears to be? |
No, he witholds assent to everything. |
*Sigh. I misphrased that. I added "in a way" in order to clarify, hoping that you would understand what I meant. You didn't, but that was my fault. I get my idea across elsewhere in that post, so there should be no harm done.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | What do you mean he admits to the probabilities of existences? The machine existing is only more probable if you hold the principle that sense experience makes something more likely. Pyrrhonian Skeptics deny this principle, so the machine existing is no more likely then it not existing. |
I have read several essays/articles that support that Pyrrhonian skeptics weighed probabilities of existences so that they could live their lives normally and/or effectively. I believe Michael Frede wrote something along these lines.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | No, Kierkegaard leap of faith allows him to believe in something he knows to be logically contradictory. Pyrrhonian Skeptics make no leaps whatsoever; they are perfectly rational. |
Something here sounds wrong...oh yes, the Pyrrhonian skeptic is not perfectly rational. If he were, wouldn't he be quite like the Stoic? Additionally, isn't existentialism fundamentally opposed to rationalism and the concept that humans are primarily rational? In even further addition, couldn't rationality merely be the means by which the mind imposes order on a chaotic universe, another deception to which Pyrrhonism seeks to prevent assent?
Please explain "logically contradictory". I can't determine what you mean.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | ZetaAspect wrote: | | Existence is not a property |
Thanks Kant, but almost nobody holds this view anymore. |
I don't like your tone of writing. I am trying as best I can to provide decent arguments. I personally like that view, thankee very much.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | ZetaAspect wrote: | | since existence precedes essence. If existence were a property (i.e. an aspect of essence), it would have to precede itself. |
Nice argument, but not quite. Existence is a property of objects, but not all properties are essential. Existence is a non-essential property, hence it can easily precede essence (and does). All existentialists treat existence as a property, especially Sartre. |
Thanks. Of course they treat existence as a property. If they didn't, they would have to contend with a rather large paradox.
However, I don't see how existence can be non-essential, considering that a property is an essential property of an entity if and only if that entity has the property in every possible circumstance in which the entity exists. I'd say that an entity exists in every circumstance in which it exists, wouldn't you?
Also, I don't see how you equate non-essentiality with the ability to precede essence. A non-essential property is still a property, and is thus part of the essence.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | ZetaAspect wrote: | | Conversely, nonexistence is not a property |
Nope, it is the lack of a property. |
Okay...right...either you are actually agreeing with me, or you are trying to say that there is a property defined as the lack of a property...
Rephrased, my statement reads:
Conversely, the lack of properties is not a property, since, if it were, there would have to be existing objects with the property of lacking properties, which would be a paradoxical claim.
My argument still holds.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | What points are those, exactly? |
Do you actually not recognize my points, or are you insinuating that I have none? You know, if you feel that this is less an intelligent discussion and more a lecture to an ignorant fool, you can ask me to stop, or you can lock the thread.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | Skepticism, Existentialism and Relativism are all unrelated views with completely different content. As a side note, you must have very skilled friends such that they will adopt Existential positions, which few understand. |
I thought you said that skepticism was the basis for existentialism. That doesn't sound very unrelated to me.
On the contrary, my friends often use a crude mixture of those views in order to reduce every discussion to the same thing: the nature of our existence with regard to our perception (i.e. the Matrix argument). I wouldn't call it skill.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | ZetaAspect wrote: | | 2) Would you stop playing ITG just because the machine might not exist? Didn't think so... |
That's either an ad-hominem fallacy, or it's not even an argument at all. My actions are not in question; and I haven't assented to the fact that I even have ever played ITG. |
I didn't expect you to respond so seriously. If you want, I can counter by saying that your first post acknowledges that you play:
| David Hume wrote: | | How can we know that the In the Groove machine we play on truely exists, and is not a mere phantasm of our collective consciousness? |
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | What would make you think that it did not exist, given the vivacity of our perception? |
Also, your topic, "ITG2U Auto-Pruning High Scores?", says you were playing...
I think that is all for now.
P.S. Hey ArchOwl! These posts are rivaling yours on the "Fascination MaxX vs. VerTex^2" thread on itgfreak! Woohoo!
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J. S. Mill
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Joined: 28 Apr 2003
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| 41. Posted: Mon Mar 06, 2006 8:27 am Post subject: |
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| ZetaAspect wrote: | | I have read several essays/articles that support that Pyrrhonian skeptics weighed probabilities of existences so that they could live their lives normally and/or effectively. I believe Michael Frede wrote something along these lines. |
That's discussing action; Pyrrhonian Skeptics can weigh probabilities or do anything else they feel like to make their decisions for actions. We aren't discussing their philosophy of action or their motivations, we are discussing their specific epistemological views. Don't conflate ontic action with ontological skepticism.
| theficionado wrote: | | Something here sounds wrong...oh yes, the Pyrrhonian skeptic is not perfectly rational. If he were, wouldn't he be quite like the Stoic? |
Don't conflate action with ontology. The Pyrrhonian Skeptic holds a perfectly rational ontological view; his actions may individually be irrational. In addition, the Stoic's aimed to be perfectly LOGICAL, which is differen then being perfectly rational (two metaphysical principles are beyond all logical doubt, whereas no principles at all are beyond all rational doubt).
| theficionado wrote: | | Additionally, isn't existentialism fundamentally opposed to rationalism and the concept that humans are primarily rational? |
No. It's fundamentally opposed to the idea that it is possible to hold a perfectly rational view for yourself. To see this, understand that they, including myself, believe Existentialism to be rationally inferior to Pyrrhonian Skepticism; they make suspensions of rationality (in Sartre to logicality) because they find Pyrrhonian Skepticism ethically unacceptable. Alternatively, they are pure perspectivist's about the matter (this is much less common, and closer to Heidegger).
| theficionado wrote: | | In even further addition, couldn't rationality merely be the means by which the mind imposes order on a chaotic universe, another deception to which Pyrrhonism seeks to prevent assent? |
Of course, hence why they withhold assent to any quantification of rationality (such as logic) capturing it's entirety.
| theficionado wrote: | | Please explain "logically contradictory". I can't determine what you mean. |
Kierkegaard believes that God can't possibly exist and be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. His leap of faith allows him not just to suspend rationality (as Sartre does) but to suspend Logic (as only Christian Existentialists do, within Existentialism). He believes in something which is by his own admission logically contradictory.
Or rather, he advocates belief in it. Kierkegaard cannot himself make this leap of faith.
| theficionado wrote: | | I don't like your tone of writing. I am trying as best I can to provide decent arguments. I personally like that view, thankee very much. |
Sorry about that; I can't really control what psychologists call overtone in my writing (I'm high-functioning autistic). Anyway, logic defines Existence as a property, so you would be hard pressed to show me why this definition is false.
| theficionado wrote: | | However, I don't see how existence can be non-essential, considering that a property is an essential property of an entity if and only if that entity has the property in every possible circumstance in which the entity exists. |
That's not the definition of essence in logic. The definition of an essential property in logic is if that property were removed would you renamed the object. In other words, suppose Unicorns existed. Now supposed they stopped existing and I had you conceive of a unicorn. Just because they had stopped existing, would you claim that they were no longer unicorns? Mostly everyone says no; Kripke famously said yes in the late twentieth century but I disagree with this view, crediting Kit Fine at NYU for my primary objections.
If I can conceive of something, namely myself, as not existing (which I can), and I would still call myself as an idea (without an existence) myself (which I would), then existence is non-essential.
| theficionado wrote: | | Also, I don't see how you equate non-essentiality with the ability to precede essence. A non-essential property is still a property, and is thus part of the essence. |
Not all properties are part of the essence of an object. My brown hair is not essential to my self; so I can easily conceive of the brown hair preceding my essence (which it didn't, although the genes for it did) or proceding my essence (which it did; it wasn't brown till I was five or six).
Likewise with existence. It is a non-essential property, therefore it is a property which is not part of the essence of an object (by definition). It can therefore easily precede, or procede, the essence of an object.
| theficionado wrote: | | Conversely, the lack of properties is not a property, since, if it were, there would have to be existing objects with the property of lacking properties, which would be a paradoxical claim. |
Unfortunately, I can easily make the latter claim which you say is paradoxical. My laptop (an existing object) has the property of lacking the property of being a desktop. What's wrong with that?
| theficionado wrote: | | Do you actually not recognize my points, or are you insinuating that I have none? You know, if you feel that this is less an intelligent discussion and more a lecture to an ignorant fool, you can ask me to stop, or you can lock the thread. |
I don't feel that way, I honestly didn't know which points you wanted me to address. I hope I adressed them now.
| theficionado wrote: | | I thought you said that skepticism was the basis for existentialism. That doesn't sound very unrelated to me. |
Read above. Skepticism is important to Existentialism; since Existentialism is a reaction to it, but the end positions are very dissimilar.
| theficionado wrote: | | On the contrary, my friends often use a crude mixture of those views in order to reduce every discussion to the same thing: the nature of our existence with regard to our perception (i.e. the Matrix argument). |
Then debate over phenomenology with them or over postmodern metaphysics; neither of which assume a reality.
| theficionado wrote: | I didn't expect you to respond so seriously. If you want, I can counter by saying that your first post acknowledges that you play:
| David Hume wrote: | | How can we know that the In the Groove machine we play on truely exists, and is not a mere phantasm of our collective consciousness? |
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | What would make you think that it did not exist, given the vivacity of our perception? |
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I didn't say it there, I just asked for the reasoning for the skepticism. In point of fact, as you saw, I agree with his point.
In addition, I can easily deny that I ever made any other statements (you'd have to prove I did), or more likely, I could say that I used shorthand. By saying "I played today" what I really meant to say was "it seems to my senses that I played today."
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Zeta Aspect
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Joined: 08 Nov 2005
Location: Vancouver, Washington |
| 42. Posted: Mon Mar 06, 2006 6:49 pm Post subject: |
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| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | That's discussing action; Pyrrhonian Skeptics can weigh probabilities or do anything else they feel like to make their decisions for actions. We aren't discussing their philosophy of action or their motivations, we are discussing their specific epistemological views. Don't conflate ontic action with ontological skepticism. |
Okay. Well, playing on the ITG machine is an action.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | no principles at all are beyond all rational doubt |
Is ignorance rational bliss? (May not be perfectly on track, but was an interesting thought)
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | No. It's fundamentally opposed to the idea that it is possible to hold a perfectly rational view for yourself. To see this, understand that they, including myself, believe Existentialism to be rationally inferior to Pyrrhonian Skepticism; they make suspensions of rationality (in Sartre to logicality) because they find Pyrrhonian Skepticism ethically unacceptable. Alternatively, they are pure perspectivist's about the matter (this is much less common, and closer to Heidegger). |
Do you mean that it is impossible to hold a perfectly rational view of yourself?
Also, you say that existentialists suspend Pyrrhonian Skepticism because it seems ethically unacceptable. Could you explain that please? I don't want to jump to conclusions.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | theficionado wrote: | | In even further addition, couldn't rationality merely be the means by which the mind imposes order on a chaotic universe, another deception to which Pyrrhonism seeks to prevent assent? |
Of course, hence why they withhold assent to any quantification of rationality (such as logic) capturing it's entirety. |
Then why would they want to be perfectly rational? EDIT: You know what I mean...Why would they associate themselves with perfect rationality?
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | Anyway, logic defines Existence as a property, so you would be hard pressed to show me why this definition is false. |
Doesn't skepticism withhold assent to logic, especially because of opposing the Stoic view? I ask this based on what you said about logic in your post.
I can show you that existence is not a property through Kant's argument, but you won't necessarily agree. As I stated earlier, as of yet, I think it is an excellent argument.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | That's not the definition of essence in logic. The definition of an essential property in logic is if that property were removed would you renamed the object. In other words, suppose Unicorns existed. Now supposed they stopped existing and I had you conceive of a unicorn. Just because they had stopped existing, would you claim that they were no longer unicorns? Mostly everyone says no; Kripke famously said yes in the late twentieth century but I disagree with this view, crediting Kit Fine at NYU for my primary objections. |
(I already posed a question about logic and skepticism, so see above)
I could argue that my conception of the unicorn is not the actual unicorn, and that the act of referring to it as a unicorn is a simplification or a linguistic limitation. Similarly, I could argue that I can no longer conceive of an actual unicorn, since there is no method of verification that my conception is accurate, since unicorns no longer exist.
Alternatively, I could argue that the unicorn still exists in the past, and thus is not truly nonexistent.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | If I can conceive of something, namely myself, as not existing (which I can), and I would still call myself as an idea (without an existence) myself (which I would), then existence is non-essential. |
...Assuming that you are infallible and thus that your actions (you calling yourself yourself) are as rational as your doctrine. I believe you already said that that is not necessarily the case.
Additionally, you limit your definition of "existence" in a way that does not convince me of your point. Explain to me why yourself as an idea is not an existence.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | Not all properties are part of the essence of an object. My brown hair is not essential to my self; so I can easily conceive of the brown hair preceding my essence (which it didn't, although the genes for it did) or proceding my essence (which it did; it wasn't brown till I was five or six).
Likewise with existence. It is a non-essential property, therefore it is a property which is not part of the essence of an object (by definition). It can therefore easily precede, or procede, the essence of an object. |
I now understand how non-essential properties can precede essence, using your definition. However, it can still be argued that existence is an essential property, assuming that it is a property at all. That is discussed above, in the unicorn argument. There are probably more arguments of which I am unaware. I don't know what Kripke argued, and consequently I do not know how Kit Fine replied.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | theficionado wrote: | | Conversely, the lack of properties is not a property, since, if it were, there would have to be existing objects with the property of lacking properties, which would be a paradoxical claim. |
Unfortunately, I can easily make the latter claim which you say is paradoxical. My laptop (an existing object) has the property of lacking the property of being a desktop. What's wrong with that? |
When I say "lacking properties", I mean the same thing as "the lack of properties", except I changed the grammatical form. I do not mean "lacking some arbitrary quality/ies".
What I argue is that
Conversely, the lack of properties is not a property, since, if it were, there would have to be existing objects with either the property of not having any properties or the property of lacking the property of existence, either of which would paradoxical. This is paradoxical because:
"the property of not having any properties" contradicts itself, since an object with said property would, in fact, have a property;
and because:
"the property of lacking the property of existence" cannot be true for an existing object, since the existing object would have to be defined as having the property of existence.
You cannot say that your laptop (an existing object) does not have any properties, nor can you say that your laptop (an existing object) lacks the property of existence. This has nothing to do with desktops. You misinterpreted my ambiguous wording.
Note that I derive those two characteristics from:
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | Nope, [nonexistence] is the lack of a property. |
I cannot infer any other intended meanings from that statement.
You will also note that I appear to acknowledge existence as a property. I merely use that because it is what I inferred your meaning to be in that quote.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | I hope I adressed them now. |
You did , as far as I can tell.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | In addition, I can easily deny that I ever made any other statements (you'd have to prove I did), or more likely, I could say that I used shorthand. By saying "I played today" what I really meant to say was "it seems to my senses that I played today." |
Yeah, but then you'd just be being argumentative. At least in my humble opinion.
In any case, you might as well say "as far as I can tell, I played ITG today."
I was trying to address the effect of your views; I was examining whether you chose to let your ontological skepticism influence your ontic action. You knew that the ITG machine might not exist, but you made the decision to play on it anyway. At the very least, you decided to execute some set of actions, internally or externally, that generated the perception of playing ITG. So you still "play" ITG. Enough said.
On an unrelated note:
1) Why are you quoting me as "theficionado"?
2) I am not used to arguing with people who are of equivalent or higher caliber than I am. Consequently, since I am used to people of lower caliber speaking to me as an equal, an actual peer would seem condescending with all but the most apologetic of attitudes. As such, it is difficult for me to know whether a person whom I don't know personally actually respects my words, or whether that person views me as an ignorant fool, as I asked you earlier. This is made worse because DDRFreak is my first real forum experience. In effect, I am an intelligent newbie, which makes it difficult to assess my standing. Just giving an overly-long explanation as to why I am a bit touchy.
3) Hey, Arch! The posts are still horrendously long! Woohoo! My signature is screaming at me!
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J. S. Mill
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| 43. Posted: Mon Mar 06, 2006 7:08 pm Post subject: |
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| ZetaAspect wrote: | | Do you mean that it is impossible to hold a perfectly rational view of yourself? |
No, I meant what I said. It may be impossible to hold a perfectly rational view [of reality] for yourself.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | Also, you say that existentialists suspend Pyrrhonian Skepticism because it seems ethically unacceptable. Could you explain that please? I don't want to jump to conclusions. |
Existentialists, in my opinion anyway, are willing to make an Ethical Suspension of the Rational and move beyond all rational doubt to beyond all logical doubt. They believe L'ex (existence precedes essence) can be established beyond all logical doubt.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | Then why would they want to be perfectly rational? |
I never said they wanted to, I said it was a point of fact that it is perfectly rational. I don't think Pyrrhonian Skepticism is a desireable position; just perfectly rational.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | Doesn't skepticism withhold assent to logic, especially because of opposing the Stoic view? |
Sure, but skeptics don't hold L'ex. Existentialists do. And they assent to logic (atheistic ones anyway).
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | I can show you that existence is not a property through Kant's argument, but you won't necessarily agree. As I stated earlier, as of yet, I think it is an excellent argument. |
Do you mean Kant's argument in the Antinomies of the Critique of Pure Reason? Kant wrote before the invention of Stoic Logic, and his arguments are based on an epistemology using the Analytic/Synthetic distinction.
Both that form of logic and that distinction have been refuted utterly in modern discourse.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | (I already posed a question about logic and skepticism, so see above) |
Once again, Existentialists assent to logic. Skeptics do not (and also do not hold L'ex).
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | I could argue that my conception of the unicorn is not the actual unicorn, and that the act of referring to it as a unicorn is a simplification or a linguistic limitation. |
Sure, this is how Kripke argued in Naming and Necessity. I, and most logicians, don't buy it (see Kit Fine).
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | Similarly, I could argue that I can no longer conceive of an actual unicorn, since there is no method of verification that my conception is accurate, since unicorns no longer exist. |
Nobody argues this way; you can't prove I can't conceive of something (at least, I don't see how you could).
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | Alternatively, I could argue that the unicorn still exists in the past, and thus is not truly nonexistent. |
Nobody argues this way either, possibly because I can easily change the example such that the Unicorn never existed and then ask if non-existence is part of it's essence (most people say no).
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | Assuming that you are infallible and thus that your actions (you calling yourself yourself) are as rational as your doctrine. I believe you already said that that is not necessarily the case. |
My actions are not in question, as a Pyrrhonian Skeptic. Even if you could prove that it would be impossible to take any action as a Pyrrhonian Skeptic it would not diminish the rational truth of the position, just it's pragmatic value. Stop talking about action, you aren't getting anywhere with it.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | Additionally, you limit your definition of "existence" in a way that does not convince me of your point. Explain to me why yourself as an idea is not an existence. |
If you thought it was then you would also think that Unicorns, God and the Flying Spaghetti Monster exist. They don't exist qua themselves in reality; they may exist as ideas in reality.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | However, it can still be argued that existence is an essential property, assuming that it is a property at all. |
It can be, but not if you think that essence is necessity (as all essentialists do) and possibility is conceivability (as 99.9% of metaphysicists do). Because then I can conceive of something actual not existing (making it possible for it to not exist and remain itself), which would make its existence a non-necessary (and therefore non-essential) property.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | Conversely, the lack of properties is not a property, since, if it were, there would have to be existing objects with either the property of not having any properties or the property of lacking the property of existence, either of which would paradoxical. This is paradoxical because:
"the property of not having any properties" contradicts itself, since an object with said property would, in fact, have a property;
and because:
"the property of lacking the property of existence" cannot be true for an existing object, since the existing object would have to be defined as having the property of existence.
You cannot say that your laptop (an existing object) does not have any properties, nor can you say that your laptop (an existing object) lacks the property of existence. This has nothing to do with desktops. You misinterpreted my ambiguous wording. |
Okay, I see why my laptop can not have the property of non-existence. I don't see why it necessarily (essentially) can't have the property of non-existence, nor do I see why it's actual state defines its possible states (as you seem to conflate).
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | I cannot infer any other intended meanings from that statement. |
I mean that the property: "it is not the case that ____ exists" can be applied to objects and is not, at least for transcendental beings, necessary (and therefore is not essential). You seem to have a strange definition of what essential is.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | I was trying to address the effect of your views; I was examining whether you chose to let your ontological skepticism influence your ontic action. You knew that the ITG machine might not exist, but you made the decision to play on it anyway. At the very least, you decided to execute some set of actions, internally or externally, that generated the perception of playing ITG. So you still "play" ITG. Enough said. |
My actions are not in question; that is an utterly seperate question from the rational truth of the view. I don't understand why you keep mentioning them, are you making an ad-hominem argument? Are you trying to say the Pyrrohnian Skeptic is hypocritical? I'm not sure I understand.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | 1) Why are you quoting me as "theficionado"? |
Sorry, weird copy/paste.
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Zeta Aspect
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| 44. Posted: Mon Mar 06, 2006 11:38 pm Post subject: |
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| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | ZetaAspect wrote: | | Then why would they want to be perfectly rational? EDIT: You know what I mean...Why would they associate themselves with perfect rationality? |
I never said they wanted to, I said it was a point of fact that it is perfectly rational. I don't think Pyrrhonian Skepticism is a desireable position; just perfectly rational. |
FIXED. Sheesh, you reply quickly.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | Do you mean Kant's argument in the Antinomies of the Critique of Pure Reason? |
I was simply using the same terminology as when you said "Thanks Kant" when I used the argument earlier.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | ZetaAspect wrote: | | (I already posed a question about logic and skepticism, so see above) |
Once again, Existentialists assent to logic. Skeptics do not (and also do not hold L'ex). |
In the future, note that if I wanted a reiteration, I would have asked the question twice. You don't have to answer a redirected question.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | Sure, this is how Kripke argued in Naming and Necessity. I, and most logicians, don't buy it (see Kit Fine). |
Woohoo! I arrived at an expert's conclusion independently! Kudos to me!    
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | Nobody argues this way; you can't prove I can't conceive of something (at least, I don't see how you could). |
My current proof (I don't have enough time to investigate more deeply) is that you can't accurately conceive a unicorn without a way to confirm that your conception is accurate.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | ZetaAspect wrote: | | Alternatively, I could argue that the unicorn still exists in the past, and thus is not truly nonexistent. |
Nobody argues this way either, possibly because I can easily change the example such that the Unicorn never existed and then ask if non-existence is part of it's essence (most people say no). |
If unicorns never existed, then what is an actual unicorn? The name would then definitely refer to a conception which still exists. As such, no property has been changed, and one cannot tell whether existence is essential or non-essential by your definition.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | Stop talking about action, you aren't getting anywhere with it. |
You described the non-essentiality of existence in terms of your action, saying that you would still call yourself yourself if you didn't exist. I decided that passing judgement on your own identity was an action.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | If you thought it was then you would also think that Unicorns, God and the Flying Spaghetti Monster exist. They don't exist qua themselves in reality; they may exist as ideas in reality. |
They do exist as ideas, if not qua themselves. And kudos to you for mentioning the FSM. I think I should request that pastafarianism be added to the hurt/heal religion forum thread game thingee.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | ZetaAspect wrote: | | However, it can still be argued that existence is an essential property, assuming that it is a property at all. |
It can be, but not if you think that essence is necessity (as all essentialists do) and possibility is conceivability (as 99.9% of metaphysicists do). Because then I can conceive of something actual not existing (making it possible for it to not exist and remain itself), which would make its existence a non-necessary (and therefore non-essential) property. |
I am not fully awake (I saved this particular response till the end; I was quite awake for most of this post), but I think this argument is being addressed elsewhere in our discussion. I will probably realize what you are actually saying sometime tomorrow.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | Okay, I see why my laptop can not have the property of non-existence. I don't see why it necessarily (essentially) can't have the property of non-existence |
What is the difference between those two?
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | nor do I see why it's actual state defines its possible states (as you seem to conflate). |
I don't quite understand your point. (Then again, I saved this response till the end, too...)
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | You seem to have a strange definition of what essential is. |
I have not fully read Sartre's work that defines the dictum: "Existence precedes essence." Also, I was using a different definition of essential. Thus I am trying to realign my arguments to your definition, and, at the same time, I am trying to relate "essence" to "essential" to "necessary". Additionally, I find it difficult to grasp all of the subtleties, considering that I am learning this as I go along (as I stated earlier, the level of my studies is pretty much zero). I have been doing frantic research to make sure that I understand the concepts you present and that I can respond with something worthwhile. Due to the nature of my learning, my information and concept understanding aren't on par with your abilities.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | My actions are not in question; that is an utterly seperate question from the rational truth of the view. I don't understand why you keep mentioning them, are you making an ad-hominem argument? Are you trying to say the Pyrrohnian Skeptic is hypocritical? I'm not sure I understand. |
You don't understand because you are taking this too seriously. I did not mean it to be part of any argument I was making, hence why it was initially grouped under "comments". I was asking you casually, and, for some reason, I was expecting a casual, everyday answer, even on such a serious thread as this one. I could make the claim that the Pyrrhonian skeptic is hypocritical, and it would be supported by the fact that Pyrrhonian skeptics could live their lives normally: "his actions may individually be irrational", as you put it. However, I had not intended that when I brought this up.
I have another question for you (outside of the topic of the thread):
What has been your experience in philosophy? I am just curious, since you are so knowledgeable.
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J. S. Mill
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| 45. Posted: Tue Mar 07, 2006 12:01 am Post subject: |
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| ZetaAspect wrote: | I have another question for you (outside of the topic of the thread):
What has been your experience in philosophy? I am just curious, since you are so knowledgeable. |
I am a graduate student in Metaphysics and Epistemology.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | Why would they associate themselves with perfect rationality? |
You are asking about their motives, but this is just an ad-hominem fallacy. The position is itself completely rational, that is all I am trying to establish.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | I was simply using the same terminology as when you said "Thanks Kant" when I used the argument earlier. |
I was referring to that argument, were you? That argument has been shown to be false (this is not disputed).
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | Woohoo! I arrived at an expert's conclusion independently! Kudos to me! |
He's actually famous for his argument, not his conclusion. But this argument has since probably been refuted, by his own admission. I may study under Dr. Kripke in New York, I will ask him in person.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | My current proof (I don't have enough time to investigate more deeply) is that you can't accurately conceive a unicorn without a way to confirm that your conception is accurate. |
I can confirm it by verifying, through literature and dialogue, that my conception of the Unicorn conforms with the phantasmic creature we give that name. This does not require the Unicorn to exist.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | If unicorns never existed, then what is an actual unicorn? |
A creature symbolic of virginity and usually represented as a horse with a single straight spiraled horn projecting from its forehead.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | The name would then definitely refer to a conception which still exists. |
Find me some Unicorns.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | As such, no property has been changed, and one cannot tell whether existence is essential or non-essential by your definition. |
What? Look, consider two properties of Unicorns: (1) Having a single horn and (2) Not existing.
Consider what would happen if we found a creature exactly matching all of the descriptions of the Unicorn but without having (1). This would not be a Unicorn. Therefore, (1) is an essential property.
Consdier what would now happen if we found a creature actually in this world (existing) who matched all of the other descriptions of a Unicorn. Surely, we would still call this a Unicorn. Therefore, (2) is not an essential property.
What's the problem?
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | You described the non-essentiality of existence in terms of your action, saying that you would still call yourself yourself if you didn't exist. I decided that passing judgement on your own identity was an action. |
Sure, just like coming to any position is an action. But we aren't debating the action, that's an ad-hominem fallacy. I am pressing you to concede that Pyrrhonian Skepticism; the ontological view itself, not the skeptic or the way he acts; is perfectly rational. I have no idea how you can deny this point. No philosopher does.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | I am not fully awake (I saved this particular response till the end; I was quite awake for most of this post), but I think this argument is being addressed elsewhere in our discussion. I will probably realize what you are actually saying sometime tomorrow. |
It's pretty important, an argument form of the dichotomy I drew above.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | What is the difference between those two? |
You are trying to establish that existence is an essential property of my laptop. To do that, you need to show that it is necessary that my laptop exists. In other words, you need to show that in no possible world can my laptop not exist. Why is this the case?
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | I have not fully read Sartre's work that defines the dictum: "Existence precedes essence." Also, I was using a different definition of essential. Thus I am trying to realign my arguments to your definition, and, at the same time, I am trying to relate "essence" to "essential" to "necessary". Additionally, I find it difficult to grasp all of the subtleties, considering that I am learning this as I go along (as I stated earlier, the level of my studies is pretty much zero). I have been doing frantic research to make sure that I understand the concepts you present and that I can respond with something worthwhile. Due to the nature of my learning, my information and concept understanding aren't on par with your abilities. |
No problem. Being and Nothingness is a profound book; but I liked Existentialism and Humanism better (even with it's great error). I liked Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death more then both.
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Karl Popper
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| 46. Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2006 11:27 am Post subject: |
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| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | I liked Existentialism and Humanism better (even with it's great error) |
What is its great error? Wikipedia is kind of vague and I don't want to read Being and Nothingness just to find out. |
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J. S. Mill
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| 47. Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2006 1:40 pm Post subject: |
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| Tijs Verwest wrote: | | What is its great error? |
Please understand that this is an opinion. I believe that Sartre, erroneously, conflates Humanism with Socialism.
I believe there is a strong case that Existentialism is Humanistic. I believe there is no case that it is Socialist.
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| 48. Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2006 1:54 pm Post subject: |
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| Oh OK. But a while after it was published even Sartre called it an error, so apparently there's some big problem with it? I thought it was fine when I read it; nothing stood out as egregiously wrong to me. |
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J. S. Mill
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| 49. Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2006 1:57 pm Post subject: |
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| Tijs Verwest wrote: | | Oh OK. But a while after it was published even Sartre called it an error, so apparently there's some big problem with it? I thought it was fine when I read it; nothing stood out as egregiously wrong to me. |
Ah. The error to which Sartre was referring is the coining of the term "existence precedes essence," which he felt was an oversimplification of his philosophy.
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Zeta Aspect
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| 50. Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2006 7:01 pm Post subject: |
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I am going to give this a try, but I am having a lot of difficulty keeping all of the points straight. Sorry if this sucks.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | I can confirm it by verifying, through literature and dialogue, that my conception of the Unicorn conforms with the phantasmic creature we give that name. This does not require the Unicorn to exist. |
Can you confirm the accuracy of dialogue? Can you confirm the accuracy of literature?
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | ZetaAspect wrote: | | If unicorns never existed, then what is an actual unicorn? |
A creature symbolic of virginity and usually represented as a horse with a single straight spiraled horn projecting from its forehead. |
While I asked that rhetorically, I appreciate the answer. I did not know that they were a symbol of virginity. That makes sense, what with the horn... 
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | ZetaAspect wrote: | | The name would then definitely refer to a conception which still exists. |
Find me some Unicorns. |
Funny response!
The conception still exists, not the actual "unicorns".
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | What? Look, consider two properties of Unicorns: (1) Having a single horn and (2) Not existing.
Consider what would happen if we found a creature exactly matching all of the descriptions of the Unicorn but without having (1). This would not be a Unicorn. Therefore, (1) is an essential property.
Consdier what would now happen if we found a creature actually in this world (existing) who matched all of the other descriptions of a Unicorn. Surely, we would still call this a Unicorn. Therefore, (2) is not an essential property.
What's the problem? |
The problem is that I, perhaps, simply don't acknowledge (2) as a property in the first place. I also find your choice to reverse the argument to be a bit awkward.
What I mean is that you define properties to an object that does not exist. Existence precedes essence, so you could only assign non-essential properties to a nonexistent object. I don't think the nonexistent unicorn can be the same as a real unicorn, especially considering that the nonexistent one has no defining essence.
If you meant that the nonexistent unicorn was a concept, then there are always conceptual accuracy issues.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | It's pretty important, an argument form of the dichotomy I drew above. |
First of all, I must apologize, since if existence could be argued to be an essential property, it would cause NW330's TIME PARADOX! OH SHI-
Again, if existence were essential, it would have to precede itself. I shall limit the possibilities to "non-essential property" and "non-property".
Here's a crack at it. Conceiving of the object as not existing is conceiving the absence of the object. It is no longer itself, by literal definition, since it no longer is. A nonexistent object is nothing, or the lack of something. This would refute existence as non-essential.
If I am correct, though, I am misinterpreting "Possibility is Conceivability".
Here's another go. You conceive that all unicorns do not exist, replacing them with nothingness. It was conceived, so it can happen. All unicorns cease to exist. You argue that although unicorns no longer exist, they are still unicorns. You conclude from this that existence is a non-essential property.
However, when they no longer exist, they are nothing in the present, and maybe nothing in the future. However, they exist forever in the past. A unicorn is what once was, a former existence, and, as such, has not changed entirely from existence to nonexistence. Nothing is what it now is. Since they did exist, they can never completely not exist. For an object to be completely nonexistent, it would have to be nonexistent in past, present, and future.
Denying absolute locations in time, Einsteinian physics could support this conclusion.
Needless to say, there can be no argument over an absolutely nonexistent object, because it cannot change state to existence.
I just confused myself soo much...but I think I got that down correctly. Humor me a bit, but still be honest.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | ZetaAspect wrote: | | What is the difference between those two? |
You are trying to establish that existence is an essential property of my laptop. To do that, you need to show that it is necessary that my laptop exists. In other words, you need to show that in no possible world can my laptop not exist. Why is this the case? |
First of all, I reiterate: what is the difference between "my laptop cannot have the property of nonexistence" and "it necessarily (essentially) cannot have the property of nonexistence"?
I don't know what you mean.
Secondly, your laptop would not be your laptop if it didn't exist. More potently, your laptop would not be your laptop if it never existed.
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J. S. Mill
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| 51. Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2006 9:22 pm Post subject: |
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| ZetaAspect wrote: | | Can you confirm the accuracy of dialogue? Can you confirm the accuracy of literature? |
No. Hence I can never be sure if any given concept I have is identical to the intial concept. This point is in favor of the Pyrrhonian Skeptic, not against it.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | The conception still exists, not the actual "unicorns". |
Sure but we are not talking about the conception. We are talking about the Unicorns. It's their existence that is non-essential.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | The problem is that I, perhaps, simply don't acknowledge (2) as a property in the first place. |
But you need a reason not to acknowledge it. You said it you based it on Kant's Antinomy; but this antinomy is now known to be provably false. Existence is a clearly defineable property in Logic, what reason do you have to deny it's existence as a property?
Unless you meant to say that you are skeptic about whether it's a property or not. Fine; this helps the Pyrrhonian Skeptic.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | What I mean is that you define properties to an object that does not exist. |
Yes, so does that definition of Unicorns.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | Existence precedes essence, so you could only assign non-essential properties to a nonexistent object. |
This does not follow. First of all, I think you are confused about the statement. Existence precedes essence only for Dasein (self-aware beings). My cat's essence precedes his existence, as would a Unicorn's. Second of all, just because X precedes Y doesn't mean that if X is not the case then Y is not the case. It just means that if X IS the case, then it will precede Y.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | I don't think the nonexistent unicorn can be the same as a real unicorn, especially considering that the nonexistent one has no defining essence. |
Sure it does, I just gave you it's defining essence.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | If you meant that the nonexistent unicorn was a concept, then there are always conceptual accuracy issues. |
This helps the Pyrrhonian Skeptic.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | It is no longer itself, by literal definition, since it no longer is. |
That would only follow if physical existence was part of its essence. This is not the case; therefore it doesn't follow. You are building an argument of the form: "if existence is essential, then it can't not be essential." But this is a strawman argument.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | You conceive that all unicorns do not exist, replacing them with nothingness. |
No, I conceive that all unicorns do not exist; adding to their concept the property of non-existence. That is different from not concieving of them. You are committing a logical equivocation.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | For an object to be completely nonexistent, it would have to be nonexistent in past, present, and future. |
Yes, and Unicorns never existed. This is not an essential property of their existence. In addition, just because I conceive of X and it allows me to abstract Y doesn't mean X has to actually occur. I can concieve of my cat becoming emperor and therefore conclude that this is possible without my cat ever becoming emperor.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | Needless to say, there can be no argument over an absolutely nonexistent object, because it cannot change state to existence. |
We seem to have arguments over God.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | First of all, I reiterate: what is the difference between "my laptop cannot have the property of nonexistence" and "it necessarily (essentially) cannot have the property of nonexistence"?
I don't know what you mean. |
It may be the case that my laptop never has the property of non-existence. This is a different claim from saying something like "if my laptop were to stop existing it wouldn't be a laptop anymore." Of course, I will agree with that claim, since I have no trouble saying that the essence of a laptop precedes its existence.
| ZetaAspect wrote: | | Secondly, your laptop would not be your laptop if it didn't exist. More potently, your laptop would not be your laptop if it never existed. |
Fine. No problem, my laptop's essence does not precede it's existence.
What are you arguing against, let's be clear. Before you reply to this post, tell me if you are still denying the rationality of Pyrrhonian Skepticism. If you are, why are you? Don't address Existentialism until we are clear on this point.
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Zeta Aspect
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| 52. Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2006 10:15 pm Post subject: |
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I feel like shorter posts for a change...
I am no longer denying the rationality of Pyrrhonism. While I disagree on some points derived from that mode of thinking, I cannot say it is ever wrong, since it makes no assertions on non-evident claims. However, I can say that a skeptic does not necessarily live his/her life completely skeptically.
| Søren Kierkegaard wrote: | | ZetaAspect wrote: | | Needless to say, there can be no argument over an absolutely nonexistent object, because it cannot change state to existence. |
We seem to have arguments over God. |
Oh no you di'in't!
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J. S. Mill
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| 53. Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2006 10:19 pm Post subject: |
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| ZetaAspect wrote: | | I am no longer denying the rationality of Pyrrhonism. |
Good! So now let's go a little further. Do you think it is ethically acceptable, as a Pyrrhonian Skeptic does, to declare Ghandi no better a man then Hitler?
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Zeta Aspect
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| 54. Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2006 2:25 am Post subject: |
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I going to call for your definition of ethics. I've heard it used differently so many times so frequently that I can't remember which one is actually the "correct"/"standard" one.
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J. S. Mill
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| 55. Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2006 2:35 am Post subject: |
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I don't have a definition yet. I'm asking you if it's okay to you to declare, with whatever definition you like, that Hitler and Ghandi have the same moral status. It's an open question, both "yes" and "no" answers are correct. It is a yes/no question.
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Zeta Aspect
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| 56. Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2006 2:41 pm Post subject: |
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First, objective reality would declare that they are equal, since morality is a human concept: a subjective impression. Objectivity cannot make such subjective judgements, only objective ones (go figure...).
However, as a subjective impression, it can be assessed as such.
Since the majority of people would (well, probably, since I don't have statistics) declare that Ghandi is Hitler's moral superior, the general subjective view follows: Hitler was a worse man than Ghandi, morally/ethically.
Regardless, as long as the above view is not unanimous, it has the possibility to be false.
So, objectively, yes, it is acceptable, but objectivity would not even need to consider the ethical implications of declaring, one way or the other.
This assumes that goodness and morality are not universal constants.
Subjectively, however, I would lean towards saying that it would not be acceptable. Most folks (uneducated though they be about the nuances of ethics) would say outright that it would not be okay to say Hitler is Ghandi's equal.
In any case, it is ethically acceptable to have one's own opinion, so yes: I agree with the Pyrrhonian Skeptic that it is ethically acceptable to declare Ghandi no better a man than Hitler.
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J. S. Mill
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| 57. Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2006 4:19 pm Post subject: |
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Then, I see no particular reason for you to hold any belief other then Pyrrhonian Skepticism.
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Zeta Aspect
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| 58. Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2006 4:22 pm Post subject: |
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Explain.
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J. S. Mill
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| 59. Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2006 4:33 pm Post subject: |
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| ZetaAspect wrote: | | Explain. |
If you had said yes, then I would have argued that we need an Ethical Suspension of the Rational in order to develop a theory where Hitler does not wind up with the same moral status as Ghandi.
If you are willing to accept that they do have the same moral status, then you should hold the more rational Pyrrhonian Skepticism.
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